Thompson May Give Defendants New Tools to Fight False Claims Act Charges 

June 24, 2025

The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Thompson v. United States may have significant implications for the False Claims Act (FCA). In Thompson, the Court was tasked with interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement” for the purpose of influencing certain federal agencies.1 At issue was a misleading but true statement that led to a conviction. A unanimous Court held the statute does not criminalize statements that are misleading but true.2 In other words, false means false. This interpretation has important implications for the FCA, 18 U.S.C. § 3729, but, perhaps surprisingly, not because both statutes use the term “false.”3

Thompson’s Interpretation of “False” and the FCA

The FCA prohibits the submission of “false or fraudulent” claims for payment to the federal government. At first blush, it could appear that the Court’s interpretation of “false” in Thompson could impact the meaning of “false” under the FCA. However, the FCA also prohibits the submission of “fraudulent” claims. And, under common-law fraud principles, “fraudulent” includes statements that are misleading but technically accurate. Accordingly, while “false” may not include misleading, the FCA also prohibits the submission of “fraudulent” claims. The Thompson decision is, therefore, unlikely to impact the meaning of “false or fraudulent” under the FCA.

The “Resulting From” Circuit Split

On the other hand, the Court’s interpretive process in Thompson could signal an end to a current circuit split interpreting the term “resulting from” in the 2010 Amendment to the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS).

Under the 2010 Amendment, submitting a claim to the Government that “includes items or services resulting from a violation of [the AKS] constitutes a false or fraudulent claim for the purposes of [the FCA].”4 The circuits are split over the interpretation of the phrase “resulting from.” The Third Circuit in U.S. ex rel. Greenfield v. Medco Health Solutions (2018) interpreted “resulting from” to merely require a “causal link” satisfied by proof that “a particular patient is exposed to an illegal recommendation or referral and a provider submits a claim for reimbursement pertaining to the patient.”5

By contrast, the Eighth Circuit in U.S. ex rel. Cairns v. D.S. Medical LLC (2022), the Sixth Circuit in U.S. ex rel. Martin v. Hathaway (2023), and most recently, the First Circuit in U.S. v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (2025) have held “that to treat an AKS violation as a false or fraudulent claim under the FCA, the government must prove the AKS violation was a but-for cause of the false claim.”6 Practically, this means “when a plaintiff seeks to establish falsity or fraud through the 2010 amendment, it must prove that a defendant would not have included particular “items or services” but for the illegal kickbacks. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g).”78

How the circuits arrived at their interpretations is important to predicting the implications of Thompson. The Third Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “resulting from” under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) in Burrage v. U.S. as requiring causality. However, the Court reasoned “but-for” causation would frustrate Congress’s intentions in creating the 2010 Amendment to ensure more claims resulting from illegal kickbacks were considered false claims under the FCA.9 The majority circuits found sufficient support for but-for causation in the plain meaning of the text of the statute and dictionary definitions. They also placed more value on the Burrage interpretation than the Third Circuit. Though the majority courts did not entirely disregard the legislative history or drafter’s intent, they found “no convincing textual or contextual reason to deviate from the default presumption that the phrase resulting from … imposes a but-for causation standard.”10

Implications of Thompson in Resolving the “Resulting From” Circuit Split

The Supreme Court’s approach to interpreting “false” in Thompson is predictive of how it might resolve the circuit split over the 2010 amendment. The Thompson Court relied on the plain meaning of the text, the use of “false” in other statutes, and the Court’s precedent to reach its interpretation. Should the Court resolve the “resulting from” circuit split, its reasoning in Thompson shows it is likely to find the majority circuits’ approach closer to home. Like the Court in Thompson, the majority circuits focused on the plain meaning of the text and found sufficient support in the Burrage interpretation of the CSA. This approach is more in line with general statutory interpretation principles but also with the Court’s approach in Thompson. It is unlikely that the Court will embrace the Third Circuit’s quick jump to Congressional intent and legislative history.

Thompson also indicates that the Court is likely to favor an interpretation that reduces ambiguity in the law. Holding that false statements must actually be false and not misleading will narrow those cases suitable for prosecution under the statute. Charges brought under § 1014 will be less ambiguous and will allow defendants to better understand and prepare their defense. It is likely the Court would find a similar opportunity exists in resolving the “resulting from” circuit split. U.S. ex rel. Martin v. Hathaway is a good example of the ambiguity that can result from the Third Circuit’s interpretation.

In Martin, some of the alleged false claims for surgeries were for performed by the same doctor who brought the action against Hathaway. The alleged false claims also generally followed the same, normal course of business as before the alleged kickback activity occurred. The Court found no indication the claims would not have occurred anyway, even absent the kickback activity.11 It is these types of ambiguous circumstances that the but-for causation requirement will reduce or eliminate. The Court, like it did in Thompson, may favor the majority circuits’ but-for interpretation because it results in less ambiguity in the 2010 Amendment.

What Comes Next?

Though Thompson focused on § 1014, there are substantial implications for the FCA that are likely to come before the Court in future terms. The Court’s interpretation is likely to have direct implication on the FCA and resolution of the “resulting from” circuit split that has developed in the lower courts.


1 Thompson v. U.S., 145 S. Ct. 821, 825 (2025).

2 Id. at 828.

3 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729.

4 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b(g).

5 U.S. ex rel. Greenfield v. Medco Health Sols., 880 F.3d 89, 98, 100 (3d Cir. 2018).

6 U.S. v. Regeneron Pharm., Inc., 128 F.4th 324, 328 (1st Cir. 2025); see  U.S. ex rel. Martin v. Hathaway, 63 F.4th 1043, 1053-53 (6th Cir. 2023); U.S. ex rel. Cairns v. D.S. Med. LLC, 42 F.4th 828, 831 (8th Cir. 2022)

7 U.S. ex rel. Cairns, 42 F.4th at 836.

8 U.S. ex rel. Martin, 63 F.4th at 1055.

9 U.S. ex rel. Greenfield, 880 F.3d at 96.

10 Regeneron Pharm., Inc., 128 F.4th at 335.

11U.S. ex rel. Martin, 63 F.4th at 1053-54.

 

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Authors

Arthur P. Fritzinger

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James Mahady

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Calli Jo Padilla

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Co-Chair, Women’s Initiative

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